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Labour Market Imperfection and HOS Model: Some Counterintuitive Results 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
The Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (hereafter, HOS) model with Stolper-Samuelson (SS) theorem 
at its core is the foundation of the neoclassical theory of international trade. In the HOS model 
both commodity and factor markets are perfectly competitive that limits the application of such a 
model for the purpose of analyzing the problems of a developing economy where the existence 
of factor market imperfections is a salient feature. Attempts have been made to use derivatives of 
the HOS model with labour market imperfection to address the problems of such economies. 
One example of this is the two-sector mobile capital version of the Harris-Todaro (HT) model 
(known as the Corden and Findlay (1975) (CF) model). The CF is a dual economy model with 
exogenous labour market distortion in the urban sector and does not satisfy the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem completely. For example, if the price of the labour-intensive commodity 
changes the return to capital does not change. Otherwise, this structure more or less behaves like 
the standard HOS model and certain important trade theoretic results remain undisturbed. For 
example, the welfare effect of foreign capital with full repatriation of foreign capital earnings is 
immiserizing if the import-competing sector is capital-intensive and is protected by an import 
tariff. This is the standard ‘Brecher-Alejandro’ (1977) (BA) proposition which is valid in the CF 
set-up despite the presence of labour market distortion. This is due to the ‘envelope property’ of 
the CF model where the average wage of the workers is equal to the rural sector wage. A 
reduction in import tariff and a reduction in the unionized wage in the absence of the tariff are 
welfare-improving.     
 
The purpose of this paper is to introduce labour market imperfection in an otherwise HOS model 
and provide a theory of unionized wage formation. We will demonstrate that this modified 
framework satisfies the SS theorem and the magnification effect. Besides, we show that this 
structure is capable of producing certain counterintuitive results which the CF model cannot 
generate. 
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2. The Model 
 
We consider the standard HOS model with labour market imperfection in sector 2. In sector 2 
(formal sector) workers receive the unionized wage, *W , while their counterparts in sector 1 (an 
informal sector) receive a low and competitive wage,W . All other standard assumptions of the 
HOS model are retained. Commodity prices are given by the small open economy assumption.  
 
Determination of unionized wage 
 
We consider a competitive formal sector industry. Production requires two inputs: labour ( L ) 
and capital ( K ). The capital market is perfect while the labour market facing the industry is 
unionized. Each firm in the industry has a separate trade union. While determining unionized 
wage, labour is considered as the only variable input of production. The unionized wage is 
determined as a solution to the Nash bargaining game between the representative firm and the 
representative labour union. 
 
The representative firm’s profit function is given by:  
2 ( , ) *P Q L K W L            (1) 
where 2P is the exogenously given price of the formal sector’s product.  
 
The representative labour union maximizes the aggregate wage income of its members net of 
their opportunity wage income i.e. 
( * )W W L             (2) 
 
The informal sector wage,W , is the opportunity wage to the workers in the industry. This is 
because any worker failing to get employment in the formal will surely be getting a job in the 
informal sector. 
 
We consider a cooperative game between the firm and the labour union that leads to 
determination of the unionized wage, *W  and the employment level, L . If the two parties fail to 
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reach an agreement no production will take place and the workers have to accept jobs in the 
informal sector. So given the objective functions of the two parties, represented by equations (1) 
and (2), the disagreement pay-off is: [0 , 0]  
 
The Nash bargaining solution is obtained from the following optimization e xercise. 
Max (1 )2[ ( , ) * ] [( * ) ]
U UJ P Q L K W L W W L          (3) 
*,W L  
whereU is  the bargaining strength of the labour unions.  
 
The first-order conditions for maximization are 
2(1 )[( * ) ] [ (.) * ]U W W L U P Q W L            (4) 
and, 
2 2(1 )( *) [ (.) * ]LU P Q W L U P Q W L            (5) 
 
Using (4) and (5) one obtains 
2 LP Q W            (6) 
 
Differentiation of (6) leads to 
2 2 2
1( ) 0;( ) 0L
LL LL
QL L
W P Q P P Q
     
 
       (7) 
 
Simplification from (4) yields 
2 ( , )* (1 )P Q L KW U U W
L
           (8)  
Equation (7) is the unionized wage function. In general form it is written as 
2* *( , , )W W P W U           (8.1) 
 
Differentiating (8) and using (7) we find  
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2
* 1( ) ( )( (.) ) 0W P Q WL
U L
   

 
2
2
2
( (.))*( ) (1 ) 0
LL
U WL P QW U
W L P Q
    

;                        (9) 
2
2
2 2
(.)( )*( ) [ ] 0LL L L
LL
UP Q Q L Q UWLQW
P P Q L
   

if ( ) 0LL LQ L Q  i.e 1L  , 
where ( )LLL
L
LQ
Q
   is the elasticity of marginal product curve of labour. 1             
     
This establishes the following proposition.  
Proposition1: The unionised wage is a positive function of the informal wage and the bargaining 
strength of the labour union. It is also a positive function of the commodity price if 1L  . 
 
From (8) it can also be checked that 
2
2
{(1 ) ( (.)}*( ) [ ] 0;
* ( *, ) *(1 )
LL L
W
U L Q U LQ Q WW WE
WW uP f L K WL u
    
  
 
2 2
2
2 2
* { (.) ( (.))}( ) ( )[ ] 0
* ( ( , ) (1 ))
LL L L
P
LL
W P PU Q LQ Q LQ QE
PW LQ UP Q L K WL U
    
  
if 1L  and,             (10) 
2( ) 1W PE E   
 
The S-S theorem and magnification effect 
 
The general equilibrium setup is given by the following set of equations.  
1 1 1L KWa ra P            (11) 
2 2 2 2*( , , ) L KW P W U a ra P           (12) 
1 1 2 2K Ka X a X K            (13) 
                                                           
1 This is only a sufficient condition. There can be another sufficient condition under which
2
*( ) 0W
P
 

.  
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1 1 2 2L La X a X L            (14) 
where jia s is the requirement of the j th factor required to produce one unit of output of 
sector i for ,j L K ; and, 1, 2i  . 
 
(11) and (12) are the two zero-profit conditions for the two sectors while equations (14) and (15) 
are the full-employment conditions for capital and labour, respectively. We assume that sector 1 
is more (less) labour-intensive (capital-intensive) than sector 2 in value sense i.e. 
1 2
1 2
*L L
K K
Wa W a
a a
 . 
 
Differentiating equations (11) and (12) totally, applying the envelope conditions and arranging 
terms in a matrix notation we obtain 
1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2
ˆˆ          
ˆ     ˆ (1 )
L K
L W K P L
PW
E r P E
 
  
   
    
      
       (15) 
where the determinant to the coefficient-matrix is 
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2( ) ( ) (1 )L K K L W L L W L L WE E E               
                                                                            2 1 1 2( ) (1 ) 0K K W K K WE E             (16) 
ji is the distributive share of the j th factor in the i th sector; and, “^” means proportional 
change. 
We now state and prove the following proposition.  
Proposition 2: If 1 2ˆ ˆP P the following ranking must hold: 1 2ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆW P P r   .   
 
Proof: 
Solving (16) by Cramer’s rule 
2 1 1 2 2
ˆ ˆ(1 )ˆ K K P LP E PW   

              (17) 
Now if 1 2ˆ ˆP P from (17) it follows that 
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2 1 1 2
1
ˆ ( )( )ˆ
K K K L PEW B
P
   

   (say) 
Now
1
ˆ
( ) 1ˆ
W B
P
   iff 2 1 1 2( )K K K L PE       . Using (16) and simplifying one gets 
1
ˆ
( ) 1ˆ
W B
P
   iff 2( ) 1P WE E  . Using (10) it follows that 
1
ˆ ˆW P            (19) 
 
Similarly, solving (16) it is easy to show that 
2ˆrˆ P             (20) 
 
Combining (19) and (20) one can write  
1 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆW P P r   . 
If 1 2ˆ ˆ 0P P  , 1 2ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ0W P P r     
This completes the proof. 
 
It is important to note that the Rybczynski effect and the Rybczynski-type effect that occurs 
following an S-S effect if production technologies are of variable coefficient type also hold in 
this case. 
 
Some counterintuitive results 
 
Now suppose that there a tariff on sector 2. Equation (12) is, therefore, modified as 
2 2 2 2*( , , ) (1 )L KW P W u a ra P t           (12.1) 
We also assume that the aggregate capital stock of the economy consists of both domestic capital 
( DK ) and foreign capital ( FK ) and these are perfect substitutes. The capital endowment equation 
is now given by 
1 1 2 2K K D Fa X a X K K K            (13.1) 
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The strictly quasi-concave social welfare function is given by 
1 2( , )V V D D   (14) 
where iD  denotes the demand for the i th commodity for 1,2i  . 
 
Given that international trade occurs, trade balance requires  
1 1 2 2 2( ) ( ) FX D P D X rK      (15) 
where 1 1( )X D  is the amount of 1X  exported and 2 2( )D X denotes the amount of 2X  that is 
imported. 
 
Differentiating (14) yields 
1 1 2 2( / ) (1 )dV V dD P t dD     (16) 
National income at domestic prices is given by 
1 2 2 2(1 ) FY X P t X tP M rK       (17) 
where, M denotes the volume of import and is given by 
2 2 2( (1 ), )M D P t Y X     (18) 
 
Welfare consequences of foreign capital inflows, trade liberalization and labour market 
reform   
 
Differentiating (15), (17), (18), (13.1), (14) and the production functions and substituting into 
(16) the following expressions can be obtained.  
*
1 2 2 2(1 / )( / ) [( )( / ) ( / )]F F FV dV dK v W W dL dK tP dX dK         (19) 
*
1 2 2 2 2(1 / )( / ) [( )( / ) ( ( / )]V dV dt v W W dL dt tP HP dX dt                                            (20) 
 
*
1 2 2 2(1 / )( / ) [( )( / ) ( / )]V dV dU v W W dL dU tP dX dU                                   (21) 
where: 2 2[(1 ) /{1 (1 )}] 0; (1 )( / )v t t m m P t D Y         is the marginal propensity to 
consume commodity 2 (1 0m  ); and, 2 2 2 2[( / (1 )) ( / )] 0H D P t D D Y        is the 
Slutsky’s pure substitution term. 
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From (19) – (21) the following proposition can be established. 
Proposition 3: While an inflow of foreign capital and/or labour market reform may improve 
social welfare a policy of trade liberalization may be welfare-worsening. 
 
It is worthwhile to mention that in the CF model we get exactly the opposite results due to the 
‘envelope property’. 
 
We explain proposition 3 as follows. An inflow of foreign capital leads to a Rybczynski effect. 
Sector 2 expands and sector 1 contracts as the former sector is capital-intensive. As the higher 
wage-paying sector expands, both in terms of output and employment, the aggregate wage 
income of the workers increase. This we call the labour reallocation effect that works positively 
on social welfare and is captured by the first term in the right-hand side of (20). On the other 
hand, an expansion of sector 2 leads to a further misallocation of economic resources, lowers 
volumes of trade thereby exerting a downward pressure on welfare. This is the cost of the tariff 
protection of the supply side which is captured by the second term in the right-hand side of (19). 
Welfare improves if the positive labour reallocation effect outweighs the increased cost of tariff 
protection.  
 
A policy of trade liberalization, on the other hand, lessens, t . This lowers r and raisesW and 
hence *W . The higher wage-paying sector contracts both in terms of output and employment due 
to a Rybczynski type effect. This is the negative labour reallocation effect. Secondly, the 
consumers would be consuming more of commodity 2 leading to a decrease in cost of tariff 
protection of the demand side that works positively on welfare. As the protected sector contracts 
the efficiency of allocation of economic resources improves. The cost of protection of the supply 
side decreases which also works favourably on welfare. If the labour reallocation effect is 
stronger than the combined effect of the last two effects, welfare decreases due to trade 
liberalization. See (20).  
 
Finally, a policy of labour market reform lowers the bargaining strength of the labour unions, U . 
This lowers the unionized wage, *W . Sector 2 expands as the wage cost falls. As the higher 
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wage-paying sector expands there occurs a positive effect on welfare. But the supply side cost of 
protection rises which affects welfare adversely. Welfare may increase if the labour reallocation 
effect dominates over the increase in the protectionary cost of tariff. The change in welfare is 
given by (21). 
 
In the absence of any labour market imperfection, *W W . The model boils down to the 
standard HOS model. There is no labour reallocation effect. The first terms in the right-hand side 
of equations (19) and (20) vanish and we get the following standard results: an inflow of foreign 
capital worsens welfare. On the contrary, a policy of trade liberalization improves social welfare.   
 
3. Concluding remarks 
 
In this note we have shown that an HOS model with labour market imperfection not only 
satisfies all the standard properties like S-S theorem, magnification and Rybczynski effects but 
also is capable of producing certain counterintuitive results. A two-sector mobile capital version 
of the HT model does not satisfy these properties. Hence, the present framework may be useful 
in explaining as to why the developing countries are yearning for foreign capital despite the 
standard immiserizing result and why these countries are not reducing the tariff rates beyond 
certain levels. 
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